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ABSTRACT  This paper offers a critical evaluation of recent Irish industrial policy (IP) 
experience. It argues that whilst Ireland managed to get some things ‘right’ through its IP, 
substantial tensions arose through making foreign direct investment (FDI) attraction the 
centrepiece of policy, without at the same time adopting a more holistic approach in IP which 
inter-alia also placed an emphasis on indigenous firms and entrepreneurship more generally. In 
particular, greater efforts should have been made much earlier in attempting to better embed 
transnational corporation (TNC)-led activity into the wider economy, in fostering domestic small 
firms and entrepreneurship, in promoting clusters, and more generally in evaluating IP more 
fully – notwithstanding the context which mitigated against such actions. As a result, Ireland as 
an economy remained vulnerable to strategic decisions made elsewhere by TNC decision-
makers, with IP effectively contributing to a situation that can be characterised as institutional 
and strategic failure. Overall, the paper suggests that wholesale emulation of the Irish IP 
approach is problematic. 
 
Keywords: Ireland; industrial policy; foreign direct investment (FDI); transnational 
corporations (TNCs); policy evaluation; strategic choice. 
 
JEL codes: L52, O25, P51, R11, R58. 
1. Introduction 
 
Both before and after the recent ‘bursting of the bubble’, Ireland has been held up as a 
role model for other states (Acs et al. 2007; Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006; World 
Bank, 2009; Sapir et al. 2003). With growth rates of over 8% p.a. in the late 1990s, Ireland went 
from having an income per capita of two-thirds that in the UK in 1990 to parity with the UK and 
  2 
EU average by 2000. Continued growth until 2008 resulted in the third-lowest unemployment 
rate in the EU-27, at 4.1% in May 2007 (Eurostat, 2007). Yet more recently, the success story 
has soured, with the economy going into recession in late 2008, and with unemployment rising 
even before the worst effects of Global Financial Crisis (GFC) impacted (Eurostat, 2008). By 
May 2012, Ireland had one of the highest unemployment rates in the EU27 at 14.7% - the fourth 
worst record in the EU27 - (Eurostat, 2012) and the economy has faced severe budgetary 
pressure after the rescue of its banking system (with a government debt to GDP ratio for the first 
quarter of 2012 at 106.8%, well above the EU27 average–Eurostat, 2013). At the end of 2013, 
this stood at 125.7% (Eurostat, 2013). Despite this, Ireland has yet again been granted ‘role 
model’ status, albeit this time in terms of implementing austerity measures (O’Toole, 2012; 
Trichet, 2010). 
Yet given the scale of the downturn in Ireland which is amongst the worst in the EU 
(Honohan, 2009; New York Times, 2012), it is timely to offer a more balanced appraisal of the 
successes and failures of Irish industrial policy in recent years. It should be noted that this 
analysis focuses on the period before the GFC, as questions over the sustainability of Irish policy 
were actually evident well before then (see Bailey, De Ruyter and Kavanagh (2007).
1
 In 
analysing the Irish story, much of the commentary- from outside Ireland at least - has focused on 
a narrow range of ‘conventional’ policies in promoting success (as long as it lasted). Typical of 
such analyses has been the influential Sapir Report and follow ups (Sapir et al. 2003), which 
stressed the role of FDI and an attractive environment for investors including flexible labour 
markets, administrative capacity and supportive macroeconomic environment. This paper moves 
the analysis on a step further in exploring the successes and failures of industrial policy and 
whether Ireland with its classic ‘FDI-led’ industrial policy can indeed still provide ‘lessons’ for 
other small EU states. 
This is a rather different approach to the work of Acs et al. (2007) who consider the 
question of whether the so-called ‘Irish miracle’ as such could be repeated in other countries. 
Rather, the approach adopted here asks whether Ireland can anyway provide industrial policy 
lessons for other economies, recognising of course that other economies have their own specific 
contexts and specific forces at work, and any consideration of the applicability of Ireland’s IP 
approach needs to take these into account. In particular, the paper suggests that Ireland has 
provided an example for other (such as central and eastern European, hereafter CEE) countries to 
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follow in some respects but very much not in other ways. In particular, Ireland can offer ‘lessons’ 
in terms of the need to position and embed FDI, building administrative capacity and 
encouraging domestic entrepreneurship, although as subsequently argued the latter has come far 
too late in the day. The discussion that follows argues that there are severe challenges in adopting 
the ‘Irish approach’, especially as it risks entrenching concentrated strategic decision making and 
heightened risks of institutional failure as evident in the ‘strategic choice’ approach (Cowling and 
Sugden, 1999; Tomlinson and Cowling, 2011). In particular, the industrial policy lessons that 
Ireland can provide for other small EU states are examined, given that industrial policy is “back 
on the agenda” of late (Bailey, Tomlinson and Cowling, 2015). Here, the argument is that there is 
no ‘silver bullet’ (such as FDI) for economic development. Rather, states need to adopt a broader 
and more holistic industrial policy development approach and perspective than that which is 
normally discussed in the context of Ireland, and one which pays attention to strategic decision 
making and economic diversity.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews recent developments in 
industrial policy; Section 3 explores the strategic choice perspective in the context of Irish 
experience; Section 4 details the evolution of FDI-focused industrial policy in Ireland; and 
section 5 explores the impacts of FDI-led policy and growth. Section 6 concludes in relation to 
industrial policy ‘lessons’ arising from the Irish experience for other small EU states. 
 
2. Recent Developments in Industrial Policy: beyond a ‘market failure’ approach? 
Whilst now seen as “back on the agenda” at government and EU levels, historically the 
theoretical rationale for industrial policy (hereafter IP) has been primarily seen in quite narrow 
terms, in the sense of addressing “market failure” (Bailey, Tomlison and Cowling 2015). Of late, 
however, this conventional approach to IP has moved on to be more concerned with enabling 
successful economic adjustment within a country or region as industries decline and change, 
within the context of mobile global capital flows. In this perspective, firms are then seen as 
interacting with a plethora of other organisations such as research centres, financial institutions 
and government agencies. Within this approach, natural ‘systems’ of innovation and clusters are 
seen as fundamental policy frameworks. In this regard, Aiginger (2007) characterizes ‘systemic 
industrial policy’ as that which supports education, training and entrepreneurship, promotes FDI 
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and exports in catching-up economies and merges with innovation strategies, cluster policy and 
dynamic competitiveness in higher income countries. In so doing “it goes beyond combating 
market failures. It acknowledges limited knowledge of policy makers, mutual learning and co-
operation between firms, institutions and government” (Ibid, 297). More recently, Rodrik (2008) 
has emphasised the role of IP as a process of discovery requiring strategic collaboration between 
the private sector and state in unlocking growth opportunities. Overall, commonly adopted 
definitions of IP are too narrow, and there is a need to recognise that ‘good practice’ IP is much 
more ‘holistic’ in its approach and focuses simultaneously on both demand and supply side 
factors of industrial development. 
In a sense, this had been recognised to some extent in the Irish context more than twenty 
years ago, but – critically - was not effectively acted upon, in part because of contextual factors 
which mitigated against such an approach. In a seminal report, Culliton (1992) emphasised the 
need for an IP which took a much more holistic approach and which included: reform of the tax 
system; provision of infrastructural needs; re-focusing of education and training system; 
increased funding for science and technology; and a greater emphasis on technology acquisition. 
The desirability of fostering clusters of related industries building on leverage points of national 
advantage was also highlighted. As for indigenous industry, Culliton argued for the increased use 
of equity as opposed to cash grants; the expansion of the indigenous sector; and a reorganisation 
of support agencies into two, with one addressing the needs of foreign-owned industries, and the 
other the needs of indigenous ones. Ironically, the latter in turn created an effective policy divide, 
mitigating against the creation of a more holistic policy approach. While recognising some of the 
significant factors which mitigated against developing a more effective IP approach earlier, 
change in IP could be characterised as ‘too little, too late’, with IP remaining over-ridingly FDI-
orientated.   
More generally, Pitelis (2009, 97) distinguishes four main extant IP frameworks on 
competitiveness and catching-up: the neoclassical economic theory-based approach; the Japanese 
practice-based one; the ‘systems’ of  innovation view; and Porter’s Diamond, all with quite 
different implications for the role of FDI in catching up and economic development. Under the 
neo-classical approach, FDI is seen as a mechanism for the transfer of resources and factors from 
abundant to scarce locations, thereby contributing to catch-up. Under the Far-Eastern 
development state approach, FDI is a means to an end and used when necessary but not used 
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exclusively where alternatives are possible; for example, large economies attractive to FDI were 
able to use licensing (in Japan) or Joint Ventures (in China) at certain stages of development. 
Where FDI is deemed necessary for industrialisation it has been positioned within a broader 
context of industrial and competitiveness strategy objectives, even if proactive policies were used 
to attract FDI - as seen in Singapore and Taiwan (see Pitelis, 2009). In the systems framework, 
FDI is viewed as being part of the wider system and may either assist in strengthening linkages 
or may be of limited value if “footloose and stand-alone” (Ibid). Finally, in the Diamond 
approach, FDI is itself seen as a measure of success or even competitiveness (Ibid).  
 Finally, the development of a holistic IP needs to recognise the phenomenon of uneven 
development (Hymer, 1972) and strategic choice (Cowling and Sugden, 1999). In this context, an 
undue emphasis on FDI attraction towards multinational firms may serve to reinforce patterns of 
development whereby major world cities and regions attract high-level activities and investment, 
whilst in contrast peripheral countries and regions attract lower-level production activities – 
thereby serving to exacerbate patterns of inequality (Ibid). The implication here is that special 
attention needs to be paid to these more peripheral locations and regions; both in terms of 
improving local/regional capabilities; but also in terms of transport and infrastructure support, so 
as to increase their relative competitive advantages. In a similar manner, one can also refer to a 
holistic IP as addressing uneven development through promoting genuine capability endowment 
in local communities. It is to such issues that the focus of the paper now turns. 
 
3. Bringing in a strategic choice perspective on Irish experience 
A central theme of this paper is built on the strategic choice perspective developed by 
Cowling and Sugden (1999); Bailey et al. (2006); Tomlinson and Cowling (2011) and Branston, 
Tomlinson and Wilson (2012). This literature sees a key role being played by the modern TNC. 
By switching investments around the world these large and powerful firms are able to determine 
the global distribution of economic activity (Dicken, 2010). The transnationals can, at one and 
the same time, deindustrialise the “older” industrial countries (and regions therein) and 
industrialise the “new”. And within themselves, only certain actors matter in this process: 
strategy within the corporation, that is, the direction and type of development, is determined by 
those who control the corporation. Exactly who controls the corporation and determines strategy 
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has been the subject of much debate amongst economists; some argue that corporate control 
remains with senior managers, others focus on certain powerful shareholders, whilst others see 
such groups as basically the same people anyway. Nevertheless, whilst recognising the 
possibility of “heterogeneity” across firms in terms of the composition of elites, there is a 
consensus amongst economists that control of firms rests with a subset of those having an interest 
in a firm’s activities, and certainly does not rest with the workforce. Rather, strategic decision-
making is concentrated in the hands of an elite (Branston, Tomlinson and Wilson, 2012).  
Others involved and affected by such strategy may object but ultimately they cannot 
reverse such policies. The fundamental point is that a small elite will dictate strategy and thus 
such strategy will reflect their aims and ambitions: the aims and ambitions of others will be 
neglected. A distinction can thus be drawn between “corporate” and “community” strategies. 
“Corporate” strategies are viewed as strategies for development conceived by, and in the interests 
of, strategic decision makers within giant firms, whereas “community” development strategies 
are those devised by, and in the interests of, a wider set of actors in the community. The 
implication is that if strategic decision-making in modern transnationals is the preserve of only a 
few, there arises the potential for what the strategic choice literature terms “strategic failure” 
(which may be seen as a form of institutional failure), where the objectives of the elite making 
strategic decisions conflict with wider interests in society, with the result that the economic 
system fails to deliver the most appropriate outcomes for the community.  Precisely because so-
called “free markets” concentrate strategic decision-making in the hands of elites, “development 
paths based upon an especially prominent role for transnational corporations are inherently 
problematic” (Cowling and Sugden, 1999, 363).  This applies whether the firm is domestically or 
foreign owned, and where firms control multiple plants. 
 It is therefore the case that strategies for development of the developed world have often 
not met the aims and ambitions of the majority of the population within them. Such strategies 
have not necessarily been in the wider interest - the public interest (Bailey and De Ruyter, 2007). 
The playing out of transnationals’ strategies has involved both centrifugal and centripetal 
development: work has been put out by transnationals (either within the firm or under their 
control via sub-contracting) from the older industrial centres to countries where labour costs are 
much lower (centrifugal forces), but high-level strategic control over such work has been 
increasingly brought to the centres of the new transnational system (centripetal forces). Indeed as 
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Collins and Grimes note with specific reference to the Irish case “a territory can compete on 
costs only for so long” (2011, 422).   
 Ireland’s position within this international division of labour is especially interesting. 
Ireland is a textbook Small Open Economy, where exports represent over 90 per cent of GDP
1
 
and the move from “boom to bubble” mirrored the dynamic in the country’s exports growth. FDI 
was a key contributor to rapid growth rates during the 1990s (Barry and Bradley, 1997; 
Breathnach, 1998; Buckley and Ruane, 2006). Ireland benefited “disproportionately from the 
global FDI boom” during this period; from 1993-2003 it was the largest net FDI recipient in the 
OECD (Gunnigle, Lavelle and McDonnell, 2009, 52). The majority of these TNC were in a small 
number of export-oriented high-technology sectors, notably electronics, pharmaceuticals and 
healthcare, software, and international services (Gunnigle, Lavelle and McDonnell, 2009). As 
explored below, Ireland pursued an FDI-led IP which sought to attract foreign (mainly US) 
transnationals (TNCs) to Ireland in search of low labour costs (Forfás, 2011; Gunnigle, Lavelle 
and McDonnell, 2009; O’Connor, 2001), as well as quality labour, knowledge, a favourable 
economic/business climate and supporting institutions, all features the Industrial Development 
Authority (IDA
2
) has “attempted to nurture for the past 20 years” (Collins and Grimes, 2011, 
422). This brought benefits in terms of economic growth, job creation and exports (Barrios, Görg 
and Strobl, 2006) but left the country vulnerable to decisions made elsewhere by elites of 
decision makers within TNCs (along the lines suggested by Cowling and Sugden, 1999). While 
efforts were made over time through IP to improve the spillovers from FDI to the wider economy 
and to improve linkages with domestic firms, these efforts – we argue - came too late in the day, 
notwithstanding the weakness of the local sector which meant that building such links were by 
their very nature difficult. Similarly, efforts at upgrading the operations of TNCs from branch 
plant (Level III operations in the language of Hymer) to higher level functions did develop over 
time, but only slowly.   
 Indeed, from a holistic IP perspective, such efforts should have come much earlier and 
this is one of the key lessons from other economies looking to the Irish case. The slow response 
by Irish policy makers may have been exacerbated by the rapid growth experienced in the 1990s 
(averaging 7.1 per cent between 1991 and 2000- see World Bank; 2012) which took pressure off 
the need for policy reflection and reform. As argued by O’ Toole (2009), policy during the Celtic 
Tiger period was ‘clientelist’, reactive and short-sighted in its focus and orientation. Moreover, 
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Honohan (2009, 7) argues that “the lengthy period of success lulled policy makers into a false 
sense of security, not to say invulnerability”. With the emergence of lower cost locations in CEE 
states that joined the EU, Ireland later began to lose FDI, manufacturing capacity and jobs: The 
Forfás 2008 and 2013 Employment Surveys (Forfás, 2009 and 2014) reported a steady decline in 
the numbers employed in manufacturing by foreign owned firms from 112,178 in 2001 to 93,950 
in 2006. Likewise, 2013 data from the same source shows a decline from 93,950 in 2006 to 
80,780 in 2013 (see figure 1a).  
 Strategic decision makers within such TNCs could see little advantage in remaining in 
Ireland when faced with the alternative of regions elsewhere with significantly lower costs, 
whether they be in lower cost locations within trade blocs such as the EU (such as central and 
eastern Europe) or in “developing” countries. Overall, Ireland offers an interesting IP case study 
as it attempted first to establish new industries via FDI-led “industrialisation”. However, this 
paper argues that this facilitated a situation of concentrated strategic decision-making, with IP 
effectively serving the interests of incoming TNCs. It was only much later in the day that 
attempts were made to broaden policy so as to consider smaller domestic firms and linkages 
between FDI and such firms, and to upgrade TNC activities. This change began to some extent in 
the early 1980s with an explicit strategy to attract more hi-tech multinationals to “jumpstart the 
virtually nonexistent indigenous hi-tech sectors” (Barrios, Görg and Strobl, 2006, 86). 
Although prior to EU accession, Ireland showed a revealed comparative disadvantage in the non-
traditional sectors (Chemicals and Metals and Engineering sectors), its use of low corporation tax 
rates to attract FDI encouraged the influx of foreign firms in these sectors post-accession (Barry 
and Hannan, 2001). The authors also note that several CEE countries have followed Ireland’s 
example of attracting FDI with the use of low corporation tax rates. Similarly, Buckley and 
Ruane (2006, 5) argued that, notwithstanding the lack of a tradition in high-tech sectors such as 
electronics and pharmaceuticals, “policy makers believed that, with its relatively well-educated 
population, Ireland could be a competitive production base for TNCs as their low per-unit-value 
transportation costs made them readily suited to exporting from an Island economy”. However, 
as argued elsewhere Anyadike-Danes, Hart and Lenihan (2011) this preoccupation with the role 
of FDI may go some way towards explaining why entrepreneurship was overlooked in 
mainstream analysis and commentary of the factors that drove Ireland’s economic growth. Any 
approaches to pursue a more holistic approach to industrial economic development and policy 
  9 
came too late and the unbalanced situation eventually impacted on economic activity, with the 
TNCs which dominated the Irish economy relocating labour intensive activities elsewhere in 
search of labour costs, thus promoting a “hollowing out” process, with a significant run-down in 
manufacturing employment over the period 2001-2013 (Forfas, 2009, 2014) as evidenced in 
Figures1a and 1b. The latter figure illustrates that indigenous manufacturing firms were as likely 
to shed employment as foreign owned firms, suggesting that both sets of firms responded in a 
similar manner to the changing domestic and global contexts for manufacturing.  
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1a HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 1b HERE] 
 
The beginning of the current recession hit Ireland hard with some iconic TNC “pull-outs” such as 
Dell’s manufacturing plant which left Limerick in search of lower labour costs in Lodz in 
Poland. Lenihan and Bailey (2009) highlighted the fragility of a strategy that had largely relied 
on one large TNC to act as a significant generator of employment in the fourth largest city in 
Ireland, with the loss of 2,000 direct jobs at Dell in Limerick and wider multiplier effects (some 
2,600 jobs lost in the wider economy amongst Dell suppliers). A key problem here was that the 
supply chain had not diversified beyond Dell and so was particularly vulnerable to cutback. This 
was rather typical of a wave of redundancies amongst multinational affiliates in Ireland over the 
2009 to mid-2010 period in particular (others exits and job redundancies by TNCs included 
Boston Scientific, Amann, Georgia-Pacific, Teva, Element Six and many more).
4 
A similar 
outcome occurred much earlier in relation to the relocation of Fruit of the Loom (US-owned) 
from Donegal to Morocco in 2006. The decision was motivated by lower wage costs in Morocco 
which were less than 20 per cent of the equivalent level in Donegal at the time (McGowan, 
2000). Some thirty years earlier, there had been the closure of the Dutch-owned Ferenka factory 
in Limerick with the loss of 1,400 jobs in 1977 (MacSharry and White, 2000).   In a similar vein, 
there was the high-profile closure of Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) in Galway in the 
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early 1990s, with the luring of the activities hitherto carried out in Galway to Scotland by 
attractive incentives. 
The centrifugal and centripetal tendencies connected with this new globalism, with 
production leaving the old manufacturing regions of the core for the low wages of the periphery 
(initially Ireland), and with control over this process being concentrated within the core, provided 
the backdrop for what has unfolded in Ireland, and was encouraged to a large extent by IP 
measures enacted in Ireland, to which we turn next. 
 
4. Industrial Policy in Ireland (the so-called “Celtic Tiger”) 
In summarising the Irish policy experience, the area where Ireland had been particularly 
cited as a “role model” for other states had been in its ability to attract FDI - particularly from the 
United States. Relative to the size of the economy, by 2008 Ireland had one of the highest levels 
of FDI inflows in the world. The innovative character of Irish FDI-related policies should be 
noted, as well as the continual policy innovation in making Ireland a competitive market site for 
FDI (Rio-Morales and Brennan, 2009). 
Beginning with the publication of the Whitaker Report, Economic Development in 1958, 
there was a shift in Irish industrial policy from protectionism to free trade. The Whitaker report 
criticised the existing policy which protected infant industries, and recommended a policy aimed 
at promoting foreign capital with the use of tax concessions and other incentives (Donovan and 
Murphy, 2013). Successive Irish governments have since welcomed FDI and engaged in a 
strategy of “industrialisation by invitation” (Begley, Delaney and O’Gorman, 2005). Attractive 
FDI inflow policies were put in place, initially through the provision of generous financial 
assistance (mainly for capital investment) and also by granting tax holidays (up to 15-20 years) 
on the incremental profits emanating from export sales (Buckley and Ruane, 2006). One of the 
key “carrots” during the early years was Ireland’s 0% tax on exports (Begley, Delaney and 
O’Gorman, 2005). From the early 1970s onwards, the Irish government approach shifted towards 
a greater emphasis on selectivity and more careful targeting of FDI (in particular of high-tech 
sectors), with pharmaceutical and electronics especially targeted as possessing promising 
opportunities, leaving Irish entrepreneurs to operate in the traditional sectors. As part of this 
targeted effort, computer industries were very much attracted to Ireland, however, the types of 
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activities that computer industries tended to engage in were often low-value assembly operations 
(Begley, Delaney and O’Gorman, 2005). Additionally, in highlighting the shortcomings of the 
foreign-owned manufacturing sector in Ireland, the Telesis Report (1982, 151) noted that 
“foreign-owned industrial operations in Ireland with few exceptions do not embody the key 
competitive activities of the businesses in which they participate, do not employ significant 
numbers of skilled workers; and are not significantly integrated into traded and skilled sub-
supply industries in Ireland”. In other words, although the high-tech sector FDI was targeted by 
the government, the generous incentives offered to attract firms often did not have the desired 
effect. Rather, these incentives encouraged transfer pricing practices and a high degree of profit 
repatriation, such that foreign firms in Ireland carried out low level activities, which were subject 
to relocation decisions, with low R&D components (Gunnigle and McGuire, 2001). 
 Over time Irish policy makers adopted a four-pronged approach with regards to selecting 
and influencing the pattern of TNC investment in Ireland, involving the following elements: (1) 
targeting niche high value/volume product markets with European growth potential; (2) 
identifying enterprises in the above markets; (3) actively courting these enterprises and enticing 
them (via a range of incentives and also a low corporation tax
3
) to consider Ireland as an 
investment base; (4) agreeing a “package” of incentives with such investors. As aptly summed up 
by Buckley and Ruane (2006, 6), policy was “project based rather than sectoral” whereby “Irish 
policy makers recognised the heterogeneity of TNCs and their different potentialities”. On this, 
Smeets (2008) acknowledged the heterogeneity of FDI in terms of the ownership (whether 
minority or majority FDI shares and the nationality of ownership) and FDI motives (e.g. 
horizontal FDI motivated by market-seeking incentives, vertical FDI motivated by efficiency or 
resource-seeking incentives or export platform FDI driven by the desire to find an efficient 
location from which to more profitably export to third countries). As outlined earlier, a 
significant proportion of FDI flow into Ireland originates from US firms seeking to gain access to 
European markets. The motivation for FDI could also be analysed in the context of global value 
chains or fragmentation of production across firms or international boundaries, in the sense that 
firms may source intermediate inputs from foreign affiliates, which in turn, generates FDI 
(Dahlby, 2011). Following on from the above, export platform FDI is most relevant in the Irish 
context, with foreign firms engaging mostly in the transformation of imported intermediate 
inputs into manufactured goods which are later exported (Lane and Ruane, 2006). Furthermore, 
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Sweeney (2008) notes that relative to the rest of Europe, Irish policy makers were at the forefront 
of recognizing the heterogeneity of FDI.  
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the promotion and assistance of particular 
sectors by Irish industrial policymakers from the 1970s onwards was well timed. It is also widely 
acknowledged that the development agency (namely, the IDA) played a key role in encouraging, 
welcoming and providing an after-care service for firms locating in Ireland.
6
 As outlined by 
Collins (2007), the Irish government also ensured that its education policies were cognisant of 
the needs of TNCs. In effect, of key importance was how the Irish government managed (via the 
support of their agencies) “to attract and keep huge FDI through all manner of incentives 
packages” (Ibid, 60). In summary, Ireland’s success in attracting FDI can be attributed to the 
following factors: (1) EU membership; (2) Western European governance standards; (3) Being 
English-speaking; (4) An educational system highly interwoven with its FDI-oriented policy; (5) 
A low corporation tax rate; (6) The experience, influence and resources of the IDA and (7) 
specialisation in  high value added to volume ratio products which it could produce competitively 
(Barry, 2008; Sweeney, 2008). Furthermore, the IDA has been credited for its foresight and 
success achieved in identifying and targeting selected growth in high-tech industries such as 
computers, computer software, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and chemicals, thus 
providing Ireland with first-mover advantage in these industries (Donovan and Murphy, 2013). 
Taken together, the above factors meant Ireland was well positioned to take advantage of the 
‘high tech revolution’ in the 1990s serving as an intermediary between Silicon Valley and 
Europe, without which “it is quite likely there would have been no Celtic Tiger” (Donovan and 
Murphy, 2013, 27). However, the same factors which stimulated rapid growth in the Irish 
economy, that is, the localisation of FDI in selected high-tech industries and over-reliance on 
FDI originating from the US also made it vulnerable to global shocks within the high tech 
industries, as well as to a downturn in the US economy (Murphy, 2006) as well as low cost 
competition with European enlargement. 
Without doubt, we concur with Killeen (1975) in that Ireland needed FDI for economic 
growth and that a reliance on purely indigenous firms would not have delivered sustainable 
economic growth. However, the argument here is that an over-reliance on FDI (without a 
concomitant commitment to indigenous firms) in turn also failed to deliver in terms of 
sustainable long-run economic growth. A more holistic/sustainable approach to economic 
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development which has a form of diverse “ownership mix” at its heart is therefore suggested 
below as a key lesson of experience. In essence, for much of its recent history Ireland 
simultaneously combined an IP approach orientated virtually completely towards attracting FDI 
via policies such as low tax rates, alongside weak mechanisms to build domestic capabilities and 
wider resilience (Kirby, 2010). As Bradley (2002, 26-73) has stressed, the state simply adapted to 
the needs of the firm in the global corporate environment in what Kirby (Ibid, 46) terms a 
“reflexive dependence” on incoming multinationals. Similarly, Jacobson and Kirby (2006, 28) 
refer to the neglect of policy support for indigenous firms outlining that “the state built a strategy 
for deriving economic benefits from globalization”.  
 The assumption by successive Irish Governments was that FDI infusion would result in 
wider economic benefits through spill-over effects generated by the presence of TNCs in a host 
economy. In terms of the Irish experience in this regard, what does the evidence say about the 
existence of linkages and spillovers? And related to this, did a strategy of pursuing FDI led 
growth lead to a neglect of the indigenous sector (largely SMEs) in Ireland?  It is to these 
questions that the paper turns next, with the section concluding by examining the related issue of 
the creation or otherwise of successful industrial clusters in Ireland.  
 
5. The Impacts of FDI-led Policy and Growth 
As noted, the Irish government, on recognising the limitations of purely focusing on FDI 
as an engine of growth, also sought to develop indigenous SMEs and entrepreneurship more 
generally (see Bailey, De Ruyter and Kavangh, 2007; Bailey, Lenihan and Singh, 2012). Whilst 
acknowledging this, it is argued here that the focus on indigenous SMEs and entrepreneurship by 
Irish policymakers should have come at a much earlier stage of development. As Barry and 
Bradley (1997, 21) note, “the attention of policy makers may have been distracted from the 
requirements of indigenous manufacturing by the high profile attached to the attraction of 
multinationals”.    
Despite the fact that “even as far back as 1979, some 95% of all manufacturing units 
could be classified as SMEs” (Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006, 282), it is surprising 
that there was not a formal focus by the Irish government on the small firms sector until 1994, 
culminating in the publication of the “Task Force on Small Business Report”. However, it needs 
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to be acknowledged, as Barry and Bradley (1997) recognise, that one reason for this “neglect” by 
policymakers of indigenous industry may also have been due to the fact that there was little 
actual potential for the vast majority of indigenous industries which had grown up under the 
protectionist policies (operating until the early 1960s) and that Irish policymakers could have 
done little anyway by means of intervening to reorientate these indigenous industries towards the 
international market place. This raises an important point regarding disciplining domestic firms 
and industries built up through IP, as noted by Bailey, Lenihan and Singh (2012), in the context 
of East Asian experience with IP from the “development state” perspective.  
 To explore the issue of “balance” and the “ownership mix” in Ireland, the paper examines 
the contribution of indigenous and foreign-owned firms in Ireland specifically as regards 
employment and export performance.   
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
As evident from Figure 2, in 2011 there were 4,516 manufacturing enterpises
4
 in Ireland.  
This was a decrease of 473 enterprises since 2008 (CSO, 2013a).  A breakdown by country of 
ownership shows that the number of Irish-owned enterprises declined by 1,325 enterprises, while 
the number of foreign-owned firms increased from 444 firms in 2008 to 1,296 firms in 2011.  
As can be seen in Figure 3, data from the Irish Central Statistics Office (CSO) and in particular 
the CSO’s Census of Industrial Production for 2008 to 2011 suggest that foreign firms represent 
just under 50% of manufacturing employment in Ireland.
5 
Meanwhile, Forfás (2014) indicates 
that total employment in manufacturing fell by 26.8% over the period 2001  to 2013with a fairly 
consistent increase (138.9%) in Business, Financial and Other Services over the same period.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
Forfás also highlight that foreign firms represented much of the decline in manufacturing 
(27.9% 2001-2013), implying perhaps that foreign owned TNCs in Ireland were undertaking 
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their manufacturing in locations outside Ireland. The decline in Irish-owned manufacturing 
employment was slightly lower at 25.6 %  over the same period. 
 
Related to this, Barry, Bradley and O’Malley (1999) highlight the weak performance of 
the indigenous manufacturing sector historically. They allude to the restrictions placed on the 
ability of indigenous firms to perform better than they did on past economic policies (through 
protectionism in the 1930s) and much later, a lack of policy attention in favour of a concentration 
on TNC-led inward FDI. However, they also go on to stress that the specific policy needs of the 
indigenous sector were met more vigourously during the 1980s and 1990s, thus providing for a 
strong resurgence in the fortunes of indigenous Irish manufacturing; “by 1998 employment in the 
sector was up 9% on its 1988 figure…we see that the proportion of indigenous industrial output 
that was exported rose from 26.6% in 1986 (unchanged from the 1973 and 1976 levels) to 33.4% 
in 1990 and 35.9% by 1995” (Ibid, 33-34). In a related vein, O’Donnell (1998) notes that in 
manufacturing, the exports of Irish-owned firms grew at an annual rate of 11% in the period 
1986-1995, slightly ahead of the EU (10.2%) and the OECD (10.5%) (Ibid,14).  
Given such figures, a key question arising as to the increased presence of FDI over time is 
its impact on indigenous firms. Our view is that the improved performance of indigenous 
manufacturing firms in the 1980s can only be ascribed to the presence of TNCs in a minimal 
way. Supporting this view, Barry, Bradley and O’Malley (1999) “ascribe this (their performance) 
to the benign economic environment of the 1990s, to the fact that only the most resilient and 
outward-oriented of indigenous firms would have survived the traumatic decade of the 1980s, 
and to the increased focus of IP on the development of a strong indigenous sector” (Ibid, 38). It is 
fair to say that by the 1990s, the spillover effect arising from the presence of TNCs was starting 
to take place on the ground, in terms of the transfer to the indigenous sector of advanced human 
capital, the transfer of learning and knowledge and know-how from the superior systems and 
processes of the TNCs to some of indigenous firms and the opening up of channels and networks 
overseas (Giarratana, Pagano and Torroso, 2005; Andreosso-O’Callaghan, Lenihan and Reidy, 
2014). Related to this was the emergence of the Irish indigenous software sector based on 
linkages from foreign firms (see below). Whilst acknowledging this, the point here is that the 
Irish government largely neglected the indigenous (largely SME sector) until the mid-1990s, 
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despite an increased policy focus from a very low base during the 1980s. This is highlighted in 
comments from various reviews of IP over the years; for example the Telesis Group (Telesis, 
1982), which highlighted Ireland’s over-emphasis on foreign industry as well as the Culliton 
Report (Culliton, 1992). Yet as detailed earlier, it was not until the 1994 Task Force on Small 
Business Report that SME policy finally began to move to centre stage. Various steps were taken 
by policy makers to support small business following policy recommendations outlined in the 
1994 Task Force on Small Business Report. These included the disbursement of loans and grants, 
lowering the threshold for firms to qualify for the 12.5 per cent corporation tax on trading 
income, reducing the higher tax rate of personal income tax to 42 per cent, as well as the 
establishment of City and County Enterprise Boards (Department of Jobs, Enterprise and 
Innovation, 2003).   
 
Linkages and Spillovers? 
There was, it is fair to argue, the hope that indigenous SMEs would “grow from foreign 
firms through linkages and spillovers” (Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006, 280). In 
reality, how successful (when they finally happened) were Irish Government policy interventions 
in achieving positive linkages and spillovers between TNC and indigenous (largely SME) firms?
6 
Despite the rhetoric of FDI-led adjustment, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the 
Irish economy operated according to a “Lewis-type” dualism (Ugur and Ruane, 2004), with little 
relationship between the foreign (FDI) and domestic sectors. As such, each sector appears to 
have developed according to its own pattern. Nevertheless, there was evidence from some sectors 
at least of increased linkages over time (such as in electronics, as discussed by Görg and Ruane 
[2001]), even if foreign firms had lower linkages – perhaps due to the necessary scale needed to 
supply such firms (Ibid). Other authors (see Kearns and Ruane, 2001) suggest that the level of 
R&D activity in a plant is a key determinant with regards to firstly, lengthening the duration over 
which that plant will stay in Ireland and secondly, with respect to improving the quality of the 
employment generated in the plant. For high-technology sectors, the evidence of spillover effects 
is even more apparent (Barry and Van Egeraat, 2008; Görg and Strobl, 2003). Here, there is 
evidence to suggest that the presence of TNCs in high-technology sectors had a “life-enhancing” 
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effect on indigenous plants in Ireland, improving indigenous entry rates, and improving links 
between manufacturers and components suppliers in sectors such as IT. 
Yet more generally the picture is much less clear, as reflected in the work of a range of 
researchers (Forfás, 2004; Heanue and Jacobson, 2003) who explore the issue of linkages in 
Ireland. The National Linkages Programme (NLP) introduced in 1985 shifted policy towards the 
building of supply networks and chains as opposed to actual direct local company linkages, but 
with mixed success: Forfás (2004) argue that the NLP stopped short of reaching its potential, 
while Heanue and Jacobson (2003) argue that there was some success up to the 1990s but 
thereafter the impact was insignificant. Similarly, Brennan and Breathnach (2009) also refer to 
the limited success of the NLP. The overriding conclusion on the success or otherwise of 
linkages in Ireland was summed up by Ruane (2001, 12) who concluded that “it is hard to either 
totally prove or disprove” whether linkage policies have been successful. What is clear, however, 
is that more could have been done earlier by Irish policy makers to promote linkages.  This view 
is supported, for example, by Tavares and Young (2005) who argue that “it was only in the mid-
1990s that there was a policy shift to promote the indirect impacts of FDI, through building 
linkages between the domestic and foreign sectors and supporting manufacturing 
agglomerations” (Ibid, 8). This would appear to have come almost 40 years too late given that as 
far back as the “First Programme for Economic Expansion” (1958), Irish policymakers had 
targeted FDI. More specifically, Tavares and Young (2005) attribute poor linkages to the fact 
that employment generation was the key – if not the sole - objective of the Irish industrial 
development strategy for many years. Other authors such as Kennedy (1991) and Tansey (1998) 
also cite the level of domestic linkages created by multinationals as a cause for concern. The 
seemingly weak linkages between foreign and domestic firms may have been related to Ireland’s 
poor national system of innovation as highlighted by Mjoset (1993), drawing out the need for the 
adoption of a systems of innovation approach. 
The IT sector was seen as being of particular importance in the Irish case, as software 
firms have been regularly cited by commentators as one of the most successful examples of FDI 
spillovers (see Acs et al. 2007, 2007; Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006). On this, 
Buckley, Leddin and Lenihan (2006) argued that a number of factors contributed to maximising 
productivity spillovers to the indigenous software industry in Ireland, including: (1) the fact that 
TNCs choosing Ireland could be described as technologically superior; (2) the TNC software 
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sector in Ireland was almost entirely export focused; (3) former TNC employees who 
subsequently went on to establish their own new ventures were key transmitters in terms of 
knowledge transfers to the indigenous software firms; (4) indigenous software firms 
demonstrated a high absorptive capacity: (5) the clustering of indigenous and TNC firms; and (6) 
the indigenous software sector had been enhanced by Irish government policies which focused on 
a reorientation of the education system in the 1980s so as to provide a pool of graduates for 
technology focused industries.  
From a policy perspective, small EU states studying the Irish case might find it 
worthwhile to pay due attention to identifying the myriad of factors that are likely to contribute 
towards maximising productivity spillovers. Yet as noted, this success in attracting high-quality 
FDI brought with it a vulnerability to strategic decision making by TNCs headquartered outside 
Ireland. Jacobson and Kirby (2006) also echo this point more specifically; citing the work of 
O’Heara (1988, 2000), they questioned the vulnerability of Ireland’s reliance on high levels of 
FDI. This was starkly illustrated through the case of the Canadian software firm Corel which was 
widely viewed as the star “success story” of plant upgrading in the 1990s only to be closed down 
in 2000 when corporate needs for closure out-weighed the benefits of the strong local links built 
up by the firm (White, 2004). It is important to note that as part of a multiplant enterprise, the 
need for cutting local production can come from two distinct sources: first, the cutting of output 
in response to changes in local costs and second, in response to changes in demand conditions in 
the plant’s industry e.g. in declining industries (Kneller et al. 2012). 
 
Clusters and Sectors 
Also necessary for maximising FDI spillovers and linkages is the development of 
industry clusters. On this, efforts to build sectoral and spatial clusters in Ireland really only began 
in the 1980s (Buckley and Ruane, 2006); again the key point is that this policy focus should have 
come earlier. Such efforts were focused around key high technology sectors, namely, electronics, 
medical devices and chemicals and pharmaceuticals. In line with this, particularly for IT, some of 
the key names in these sectors (namely, Intel and Microsoft) were attracted to set up operations 
in Ireland. As such, with the location of such firms, and subsequently Hewlett Packard in 
printing, Ireland to all purposes had an “electronics hub” and the “spokes” were soon populated 
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by dozens of smaller enterprises (Ibid). Yet while Ireland could be said to have been a significant 
beneficiary of the formation of clusters, evidence regarding the actual impact of clusters in 
Ireland is limited and inconclusive (Barry, 2008). What evidence exists has tended to suggest that 
there has been relatively little sectoral clustering between TNCs and local firms, at least in low-
tech sectors and manufacturing overall (Buckley and Ruane, 2006). 
The Irish government (Government of Ireland, 2008; Small Business Forum, 2006) 
recognised, however, that as more low-value-added activities were shifted by footloose TNCs to 
lower-cost countries, a greater proportion of GNP would have to be produced by indigenous 
firms. Whilst welcoming this fresh focus, this should have come much earlier and provides an 
important “lesson” for other small EU states in their IP. This only serves to reiterate the point 
that a holistic IP needs to account for the limitations and fragilities of FDI-led growth and hence 
also promote measures to grow domestic capacity. 
In addition, from around 2003 onwards, development agencies (e.g. IDA) to an extent 
turned the focus of their attention from manufacturing towards service sector firms. This change 
of focus was largely driven by the standard rate of corporation tax of 12.5% which was levied on 
all manufacturing and services companies operating in Ireland. An example of its impact was 
highlighted by Barry and Van Welsum (2005), with employment in the International Financial 
Services Centre (IFSC, located in Dublin) significantly increasing as a result (see figures 1a and 
1b), as well as in services enterprises in industrial parks throughout the country. One could also 
argue that this led to the neglect of a manufacturing focus and may even in turn have fuelled 
wage inflation (as services tend to have a larger labour input) and a resultant loss in 
competitiveness. Indeed, as Forfás (2007) outline with specific reference to services sectors 
“since 2003 unit labour costs have increased in a range of sectors …as firms in these sectors 
experienced high labour costs growth and limited productivity growth” (Ibid, 14).  Overall, to 
quantify this structural change occurring in the economy (i.e. a shift in focus from manufacturing 
to services), it is worth noting that since 2001, despite an ongoing reduction totaling 60,968 
(26.7%) in the number of Manufacturing jobs, there has been fairly consistent growth (28,047 
jobs; 138.9%) in Business, Financial and Other Services over the same period, with a relative 
consolidation of employment over the past year (Forfás, 2009, 2014). A breakdown of the 
manufacturing job losses by ownership over the period 2001- 2013 indicates a loss of 31, 398 
jobs (27.9%) in foreign-owned firms and 29, 570 jobs (25.6%) in Irish-owned firms. By contrast, 
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job growth in Business, Financial and Other Services was higher in Irish-owned firms (19,173 
jobs; 167.5%) relative to foreign–owned firms (8,874 jobs; 101.6%).  
In summary, it would be unfair to paint a too “negative” picture of the role of FDI in 
Ireland. On the contrary, it is acknowledged here that the exports and employment of these firms 
constituted a significant part of Ireland’s economic transformation (Görg, and Strobl, 2002; O’ 
Donnell, 1998). In addition, it is also acknowledged that over time the “quality” of FDI in Ireland 
did indeed improve - a point articulated in the writings of, inter alia, Barry and Van Egeraat 
(2008) and Grimes and White (2005). More specifically, Barry and Van Egeraat (2008), studying 
the case of the computer industry in Ireland, argue that this “upgrading” took several forms 
including the replacement of TNCs that left Ireland by new TNCs which operated in higher wage 
and higher technology segments. In a related vein, they also point out that many of the assembly 
plants that did remain moved away from assembly into higher value-added non-manufacturing 
functions (see also Grimes and White, 2005, 2173). Whilst acknowledging this “upgrading” of 
TNC activity overtime, the real policy lesson here is that a concerted policy focus along these 
lines should and could have happened earlier not withstanding some of the mitigating factors 
recognised in this paper.  Noting Barry and Van Egeraat (2008), it was not until the mid to latter 
part of the 1990s that the IDA started to be more selective vis-à-vis the type of TNC activity 
targeted to come to Ireland; “in 1996 the IDA started to actively discourage large companies 
from locating certain manufacturing operations in Ireland, due to increasing competition from 
low-wage economies” (Ibid, 46). In terms of policy, the lesson here is that it is the quality of FDI 
that matters for development and not just the quantity. 
 
Beyond “Boom-Bust” 
Early warning signs of iconic TNCs leaving Ireland during the GFC might lead one to 
conclude that the story of FDI in Ireland is one of “boom and bust” in FDI.  Yet more nuanced 
approaches such as that provided by Barry and Bergin (2010) suggests that while indigenous 
manufacturing firms performed poorly relative to the TNC sector with regard to job losses from 
2008 to 2009, the opposite is the case for services, where indigenous firms were more buoyant 
over the same time period, therefore an even share of job losses appears to have occurred overall. 
Most recent evidence by Barry and Bergin (2012) demonstrated that Ireland ended up bucking 
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the trend after the collapse in international FDI flows. Throughout 2008 and 2009, job losses and 
firm closures were fairly equally spread between indigenous and MNC sectors. However, 
employment growth in the pharmaceutical sectors has been mostly strong and sustained with 
these jobs displaying the highest level of wage increases (Barry and Bergin, 2010) (interestingly 
this has been portrayed as a sector where a “proactive and resource-intensive industrial policy” 
did help to underpin a “significant strategic upgrading” and the growth of high-wage, high-skill 
jobs – [Hannon et al. 2011, 3693]). Also of note is earlier work by Barry and Kearney (2006) 
which found that Ireland’s FDI sectors may indeed have a stabilising effect on the economy due 
to their sectoral composition. Giblin and Ryan (2012), find that although there have been 
closures in multinational companies in Galway for example, (third largest city in Ireland), most 
notably Abbott in 2007, the number of medical technology firms continue to rise. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
Indeed, a “boom-bust” scenario is not apparent from examining FDI data over the 1990-
2009 period, although Figure 4 (which provides data on inward FDI investment) becomes more 
volatile as it moves right. While 2008 did see a large outflow, it was not as large as the 2005 
outflow, when there was no recession in Ireland (on the background to the 2005 outcome, see 
Brennan and Verma, 2010).  Furthermore, 2009 saw inward investment in Ireland rebound once 
more. Thus, our overall conclusion here is that FDI in Ireland is not a simple “boom-bust” story. 
Aggregate figures tend to mask the impact on local economies in Ireland when a TNC pulls out. 
Examples of the latter include inter alia: Aetna in Castle island Co Kerry in existence for 20 
years but closed in 2011 with the loss of all 101 jobs; Biotech Engineering with the loss of 200 
jobs in Louth (May 2010); and Stiefel Laboratories with the loss of 250 jobs in Sligo (November 
2009).
7
 Additionally,  as Collins and Grimes (2010, 4) note “in a six month time period (August 
2008 to February 2009) the Irish technology sector lost nearly 10,000 jobs, over 8,000 of which 
were offshored to different territories”. What seems clear, however, is that Ireland is now 
suffering from competition for FDI from emerging economies - and is no longer a cheap country 
in which to do business, due to rises in wages and raw material costs.
8 
In the recently published 
Ireland’s Competitiveness Performance Report (2013), Ireland had the 11th highest net labour 
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costs level in the OECD).
9
 Additionally, Ireland had the 12
th
 highest hourly compensation costs 
for manufacturing  and remains the 7
th 
most expensive country in the euro areas measured by 
Eurostat’s Price Level Indices (Forfás, 2013,8). 
The challenge set by Forfás is to continue to support and attract FDI as well as to enhance 
the success of indigenous enterprises (Forfás, 2011). Recent government strategic and planning 
publications pertaining to recovery and sustainable growth have placed strong emphasis on the 
importance of the export-led growth model. As outlined by the Department of Enterprise, Trade 
and Innovation (2010, 1), a key government high-level objective to be achieved by 2015 is to 
“increase the value of indigenous exports by 33 per cent” (Ibid, 1). In the recent Irish budget, a 
significant emphasis was also placed by the Irish government on measures to support indigenous 
firms and entrepreneurship.  Such measures included inter-alia the continued delivery of over €2 
billion in new (non-bank) credit schemes, targeted at the full spectrum of businesses from micro-
enterprises through SMEs to mid-sized Irish exporting businesses and high-growth technology 
firms
10
. As argued throughout this paper, this strategic refocusing of IP from an almost singular 
concentration on FDI to supporting indigenous enterprises should have come much earlier for 
Ireland. 
 
6.  Conclusion: Learning the “Right” Policy Lessons 
Despite the more positive aspects of the FDI experience for Ireland highlighted above, 
this paper sends a warning to those who would simply point to the virtues of FDI-focused IP. In 
essence, the Irish case demonstrates that the economy is vulnerable to both external shocks and 
decision-making at corporate headquarters elsewhere, with an over-reliance (certainly in the past) 
on FDI bringing with it the dangers of institutional and strategic failure. It is important however, 
to take a nuanced view of events and for that reason the importance of pursuing an IP strategy 
that acknowledges the (widely recognised) benefits of FDI coupled with a clear strategy for 
indigenous firms and entrepreneurship more generally is emphasised. The latter, although finally 
pursued by Irish policy makers to some degree, should have occurred much earlier, 
notwithstanding the significant factors mitigating against such an approach. 
 This was a critical mistake in policy development, and has important implications for 
other small EU states which might wish to learn from lessons with FDI experiences in peripheral 
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regions of the EU and take on board elements of “good practice”, for example, in terms of 
positioning FDI policy within a broader, more holistic IP. More specifically, it could focus on 
targeting strategic sectors and linking FDI to cluster development, building trust with local 
managers in order to try to upgrade local plants, undertaking sector specific research on the 
strengths and weaknesses of local industry, providing aftercare support, targeting financial 
assistance at specific upgrading needs (e.g. investment in R&D rather than general support), and 
the evaluation of performance (see Amin and Tomaney, 1995).  
Whilst recognising the potential benefits of FDI for economic development in Ireland, the 
limitations of FDI-led growth have been increasingly – if belatedly – recognised. Ireland - 
particularly of late - has been vulnerable to the downturn in the US economy, given its 
overwhelming reliance on US-based FDI (and the construction sector) (Central Bank of Ireland, 
2007; Hennigan, 2009). Additionally, the apparent failure to achieve more significant spillovers 
from the FDI sector to the indigenous sector only reiterates the need to facilitate domestic 
capacity and innovation.  
Overall, such a heavy reliance on FDI to drive industrial development and upgrading 
“worked” in a limited sense for a limited period of time in Ireland, but reached its limits when 
faced with changing TNCs’ strategies, new technologies, rising wages, adverse exchange rate 
movements, and the failure to maintain a social consensus over distributing the benefits of 
growth (see Bailey, De Ruyter and Kavanagh, 2007). Most recently, Ireland has been profoundly 
affected by the GFC. As Lall (2006) has noted in the context of East Asian ‘tigers’, in the longer 
run the only way to promote successful industrial development is through developing and 
diversifying local capabilities, and that whilst TNCs can assist in this they will do so only up to 
the point where it is profitable for them. More broadly, it is up to the government to provide the 
quasi-public goods needed for domestic capability development, upgrading and collective 
learning (all essential features to address the problem of uneven development, as referred to 
earlier). Whilst this has been belatedly realised to some extent in Ireland, a more holistic 
approach to policy development at a much earlier stage – notwithstanding the barriers to such an 
approach - could have avoided some of the problems identified above and could have enhanced 
economic development. 
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In concluding this paper, it would be remiss not to acknowledge the major contribution 
that FDI continues to make to the Irish economy. For example, according to recent available data 
from the Industrial Development Authority Annual Report and Accounts (2012), FDI accounts 
for 1 in every 2 jobs and €122 billion in estimated exports (IDA, 2013, 3&6).  Additionally, FDI 
is worth €19 billion to the Irish economy and FDI companies accounted for almost 20% of 
overall business spend on Research, Development and Innovation (IDA, 2012, 6). Clearly, FDI is 
crucial to Ireland’s economic development; we do not argue against this.  However, if there is 
one lesson that other similar type economies can derive from the Irish experience, it is that 
industrial diversity in terms of the type of firm ownership, size of firms and sector is likely to 
lead to a more sustainable and less vulnerable economic growth path in the medium to long-run. 
In summary, a more holistic approach to IP along the lines as outlined in the current paper is 
likely to be a better strategy in the long-run. Our overriding conclusion therefore, is that 
wholesale emulation of the Irish IP approach is problematic, even recognising other economies 
have their own specific contexts and specific forces at work, and any consideration of the 
applicability of Ireland’s IP approach needs to take these into account. 
 
Endnotes 
1. There are a number of factors that can be seen as having undermined Ireland’s long-run 
economic growth; note, for example high energy costs which are recognised as having adversely 
affected competitiveness (National Competitiveness Council, 2009). 
2. Exports of goods and services (€145,902m) as a % of “GDP at current market prices” in 2009 
and €157,673 in 2010, €176,736million in 2012.  Source: CSO 'Quarterly National Accounts 
(Table 2), Quarter 2, 2012. 
http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/na/quarterlynationalaccountsquarter22013/ 
(accessed 23
rd
 October 2013). 
3. Initially there was a 10% corporation tax on profits of manufacturing companies, later rising to 
12.5%. Over time this was extended to all sectors (Buckley and Ruane, 2006).  
4. Based on Structural Business Statistics (SBS) used by the CSO, which surveys enterprises 
with 3+ employees. Enterprises with less than 3 employees are considered statistically 
insignificant (CSO, 2012b).  
5. Survey of annual census of employment in all manufacturing and services companies 
supported by the enterprise development agencies (IDA Ireland, Enterprise Ireland, Shannon 
Development and Údarásna Gaeltachta). 
6. See Pike, Rodríguez-Pose and Tomaney (2006). 
7. See Collins and Grimes (2010). 
8. See National Competitiveness Council (2009a, 9), which highlights a sharp decline in Irish 
cost competitiveness from 2000 to 2008. 
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9. Note also higher electricity costs: by 2011, electricity costs were the 5
th
 most expensive in the 
Eurozone (National Competitiveness Council, 2012).  
10. Minister Bruton’s Budget 2014 Published on Tuesday 15th October 2013 “Over 48,000 new 
jobs to be supported in 2014 through DJEI Budget – Minister Bruton” 
http://www.merrionstreet.ie/index.php/2013/10/over-48000-new-jobs-to-be-supported-in-2014-
through-djei-budget-minister-bruton/ 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1a. Sectoral trends in permanent full-time employment in all agency-assisted companies, 
2001 – 2013. 
Sources: Forfás 2008 Annual Employment Survey (Forfás, 2009). 
    Forfás 2013 Annual Employment Survey (Forfás, 2014). 
 
Figure 1b. Sectoral trends in permanent full-time enployment within foreign-owned agency-
assisted companies 2001-2013. 
Source: Forfás 2008 Annual Employment Survey (Forfás, 2009). 
   Forfás 2013 Annual Employment Survey (Forfás, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2.Number of manufacturing enterprises in Ireland (2008-2011). 
Source: Manufacturing Enterprises by Country of Ownership, Industry Sector NACE Rev 2. 
Year and statistic. Table A1A39 (CSO 2013). 
 
Figure 3. Number of persons engaged in manufacturing enterprises by country of ownership. 
Source: Persons engaged in Manufacturing Enterprises NACE 2 (10-33) by country of 
ownership Table AIA39 (CSO, 2013). 
 
Figure 4. 1990-2012 Inward FDI investment flows (US$m) 1990-2012. 
Source: UNCTAD Data: FDI Statistics Database (UNCTAD, 2013). 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
  35 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(Note: all Forfás figures (unless otherwise indicated) are for agency-assisted companies). 
Figure 1(a). 
 
 
Figure 1(b). 
All Sectors Manufacturing
Information,
Communication
s and  Computer
Services
Business,
Financial and
Other Services
2001 161,561 112,178 40,468 8,736
2006 155,088 93,950 47,082 13,950
2013 152,189 80,780 53,534 17,610
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
Sectoral trends in permanent full-time employment in 
foreign-owned agency-assisted companies, 2001-2013 
All Sectors Manufacturing
Information,
Communication
s and  Computer
Services
Business,
Financial and
Other Services
2001 312,335 227,595 59,779 20,185
2006 323,231 202,149 64,484 40,526
2013 303,155 166,627 75,421 48,232
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
Sectoral trends in permanent full-time employment in all  
agency-assisted companies, 2001-2013 
  36 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 4 
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